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**GUSTAV ŠPET'S AESTHETIC FRAGMENTS AND ROMAN
INGARDEN'S LITERARY THEORY: TWO DESIGNS FOR A
PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS**

Roman Ingarden, the main representative of a phenomenological school of thought in Poland, and Gustav Špet, the initiator of a "phenomenological movement" in Russia,¹ both attended lectures and seminars given by Edmund Husserl in Goettingen shortly before the First World War.² Both men drafted literary theories which, taking their direction from Husserl's early view of phenomenology and from the semantic differentiations of his *Logical Investigations*, (1900/1901), were to act as theoretical foundations for the structural exeges of literary texts as well as analyses of their interpretational approaches.

The literary and aesthetic theories of the two phenomenologists share both an emphasis upon the platonic elements in Husserl's phenomenology and, in turn, a direct relationship to the tradition of platonic representational aesthetics. Špet and Ingarden also shared along with Husserl's other students in Goettingen (A.Reinach, W.Conrad) an interest in ontological investigations and a critical distance relative to Husserl's transcendental-idealistic course, as is evidenced in the first volume of his *Ideas Concerning a Pure Phenomenological Philosophy* of 1913.

Essential differences between the aesthetics of the Polish and the Russian phenomenologists arise from the fact that, while Ingarden adhered for the most part to the phenomenological course plotted by the early Husserl, Špet concentrated on the phenomenological question of the correlation of art and aesthetic experience within the greater context of a semiotically oriented theory of culture. In his *Ěstetičeskíe fragmenty* (1922/1923),³ the phenomenological analysis of the mode in which works of art are experienced as aesthetic objects is presented in the more comprehensive context of a semiotic description of the whole aesthetic system of communication within which a work of art is conceived by the artist as a message (soobščenie) and is understood as such by the recipient. In the following, I shall first outline the manner in which Špet, in keeping with the Russian tradition of thought, assimilated Husserl's *Phenomenology of Reason* and transformed it into a phenomenologically oriented semiotic theory. Then, I shall introduce his semiotically oriented aesthetic theory as it is embodied in the paper written in 1923, *Problemy sovremennoj ěstetiki*,⁴ as well as in the

Ėstetiĉeskie fragmenty. Finally, I shall illustrate what Špet's and Ingarden's aesthetic theories have in common, as well as the ways in which they differ on the basis of the central methodological question concerning the relationship of structural and reception analyses of works of art.

1. The Inception of G.Špet's Phenomenological Approach

At the time of his introduction to Husserl and his phenomenology, during the course of his studies in Goettingen, from Winter Term 1912/13 through Summer Term 1913, Špet was an adherent of the so-called "Moscow School of Metaphysics".⁵ This current in Russian philosophy, which was initiated in Russia's religious academies towards the middle of the last century and was given its most fully developed expression in Vladimir Solov'ev's *Metaphysics of Universal Unity*, was carried on during the 20th Century at Moscow University by Sergej Trubeckoj and Lev Lopatin. The representatives of this "Renaissance of Metaphysics" believed that the origins of European philosophy were to be found primarily in Plato and in the various forms of ancient Platonism.⁶ Thus, they were led to criticize proponents of the schools of philosophy dominating Western European thought in the second half of the 19th Century - in particular, Positivism and Neo-kantianism - for having forgotten this origin of metaphysics.

This search for the origins of European philosophy in ancient Platonism was of decisive importance to the establishment of a "Phenomenological Movement" in Russia. This becomes apparent in Špet's *Javlenie i smysl* (1914)⁷, in which Husserl's phenomenology is interpreted as a temporary peak in the development of a "philosophia perennis" originated by Plato. The question central to the platonic tradition postulated by Špet and exemplified in the philosophies of Descartes, Leibniz and Lotze is the search arising out of the "Interest in Reality" for "the grounds of all beings and for being-in-itself" (JS 17). Husserl's achievement would thus consist in having integrated the modern discovery of subjectivity into his platonically determined ontological thinking by means of his correlative analyses of the forms of consciousness and object (JS 19). From this perspective, Husserl's retreat from the objects to the stream of consciousness which constitutes them appears to be evidence of a sphere of absolute being which forms the basis of the contingent being of objects.

In addition to this platonic ontological orientation, Špet's adoption of Husserl's philosophy was further facilitated by his interest in the theoretical foundation of the humanities. In fact, it was the purpose of his trip abroad to open up this area of inquiry.⁸ The practical course on "Mind and Nature" which Špet and Ingarden attended Winter Term 1912/13,⁹ as well as the lecture on the same subject, which he presumably attended during Summer Term 1913, certainly would have

appealed to his hermeneutic interests. Furthermore, Špet's critique of Husserl's , *Ideas Concerning a Pure Phenomenology* as worked out in *Javlenie i smysl*, implies a demand for a phenomenological hermeneutics. Thus, he tries to bring to light the incompleteness of the analysis of objects in the *Ideas* and to augment them with a concept of his own: the Russian phenomenologist sees as a prerequisite to the "noematic sense" postulated in acts of consciousness and whose complexity was displayed by Husserl,¹⁰ a class of intentional experience which was given very little discussion in the first volume of the *Ideas*. These are, according to Špet, acts of understanding of the consciousness which are instrumental in the constituting of all classes of concrete objects.¹¹ The structure of these "hermeneutic acts" is explained on the basis of a series of phenomena which are given only a peripheral role in the *Ideas*, such as the appearance of utensils, the specific character of historical testimony and the comprehension of linguistic expressions (JS 205-206). In this way, Husserl's "Phenomenology of Reason" - further developed to a ["Phenomenology of Hermeneutic Reason"] - is useful to Špet's endeavor to lay a scientific basis for historical knowledge and, in the end, to prepare a foundation for the humanities.

The work done following *Javlenie i smysl* on the problems of hermeneutics, linguistic philosophy and theory of art, and in particular his manuscript "Germenevtika i ee problemy"¹², written in 1918, and *Ėstetičeskie fragmenty*, can to a great extent be seen as a sketching in and concretion of just such a hermeneutically directed phenomenology, the main thrust of which is the correlation between the sign (as a composite of expression and meaning) and the consciousness which understands the sign.

Špet also characterizes his project as a semiotically oriented "Philosophy and Culture" within which language, art, myths and mores are construed a system of signs. He develops his basic sign-model in a paper written in 1917 concerning the "Object and Talks of Ethnic Psychology".¹³ His starting point here is Husserl's concept of linguistic expression, which functions as a prototype for all other kinds of signs. The idea of a "purely logical grammar" as developed in the *Logical Investigations*, which formulates rules of complexity for the grammatical meanings of natural language, is to be transferred *mutatis mutandis* to all other cultural systems.¹⁴

2. Špet's Phenomenological Aesthetics within the Context of his Semiotic Cultural Theory

The concrete form which Špet lends his *Phenomenology of Hermeneutic Reason* in his linguistic and aesthetic philosophy is directly influenced by his thought in 1918 being caught in the field of tension exerted, on the one side, by

Husserl's *Phenomenology of Reason* and, on the other, by Wilhelm Dilthey's "Philosophie des Lebens". Consequently, the Russian phenomenologist takes the direction for his "hermeneutic philosophy" as drafted in his 1918 manuscript "Germenevtika i ee problemy" from the theories of the understanding of Schleiermacher, Boeckh and Dilthey. In particular, he attempts with the aid of sign-theoretical knowledge to deepen and more precisely define Dilthey's late foundation of the humanities, for Špet the reigning highpoint in the development of hermeneutics as he understood it from Husserl's first Logical Investigation on "Ausdruck und Bedeutung" and in other semantic writings of the Brentano School.¹⁵ As he states at the end of the manuscript, both sides would be enriched by a synthesis of Husserl's semantics and Dilthey's hermeneutics. Interpretation theory would then be in a position to discover a new answer to the question of the reciprocal relationship between the various forms of interpretation, and semantics would be given in this area a "philosophically vivid and concrete embodiment".¹⁶

This enlivenment of Husserl's semantics with hermeneutic intent found its expression in Špet's *Ėstetičeskie fragmenty* (1922/23). This three-part work was the Russian author's contribution to contemporary discussions in literary theory as were common within and in reference to Russian Formalism. Špet's focal point here was upon the determination of the specific character of poetic speech as opposed, for example, to scientific, rhetorical or every-day modes of speech. In the following discussion of Špet's literary and aesthetic theories, I shall refer primarily to an article published in 1923 concerning "The Problems of Contemporary Aesthetics". The latter extends the first three parts of the "Aesthetic Fragments" in two directions: on the one hand, Špet here locates his phenomenologically determined theory of art in relation to other currents in contemporary aesthetics. On the other hand, he drafts a general philosophy of art which makes it possible to extend the path traversed in the first three parts from language to poetry to include the steps taken from art to verbal art.

In this essay, Špet contrasts his own aesthetic theory with the two theories that are in his opinion the most influential of his day: a psychological theory, which takes as the determining aesthetic factor the psychological effect of art upon the viewer, and various neo-kantian theories which are focussed on the concept of aesthetic value (B.Christiansen, J.Cohn, H.Cohen, P.Natorp). As is the case with these neo-kantians, Špet is interested in a foundation of aesthetic experience independent of the individual subject. But, whereas the neo-kantian aesthetics determine the intersubjective referencepoint of the artperceiver as the valid norm", in Špet's view, it is the "ideal being" postulated by Plato (Probl.50). However, Špet takes a position critical of representatives of the platonistic representational aesthetics which was founded by Plato and Plotin, and which, according to Špet, reached its apogee in the aesthetics of German Idealism, particularly in the writings of Schelling and Hegel: "They arbitrarily hypostasized the ideal and the

possible to the realm of the real; then, they created out of this quasi-real an independent second world which, as a more solid and ... genuinely real world" stood in contrast to the reality surrounding us and made that reality appear as illusionary and "merely" phenomenal.¹⁷ Modern philosophical aesthetics must not be allowed to succumb to this "metaphysical temptation". The (neo-)platonist view of the beautiful is subject to the criticism that here the idea as such makes claim to reality completely independently of its sensible/phenomenal representation. In contrast, the Russian philosopher ascribes only possible being to the ideas. They only achieve reality through their sensible/phenomenal embodiment within or outside art.

According to Špet, the meaning of sensible objects in themselves is stressed especially by Gestalt-theory in so far as it ascribes specific forms, the Gestalt-qualities, to sensible objects. Just as important in this regard is Husserl's concept of a "Hyletics" in which the "sensible appearances", the "matter" of sense perception, become the subject of an independent science (Probl.51-52). Thus, Špet's platonically determined art and poetic theory is linked to Husserl's phenomenology, not only by virtue of his interpreting it as the consummation of a tradition of "positive philosophy" inherited from Plato, but equally as much by his adoption of Husserl's "anti-platonist" emphasis upon the meaning of sensible phenomena in themselves.

The central question confronting any platonically directed aesthetics is that of the specific realization of ideal structures for the work of art or aesthetic object in sensible/phenomenal material. Špet develops this question from the points of view of production, reception and representational aesthetics. Thus, he speaks of the necessity of a phenomenology of the fantasizing consciousness, whose subject-matter would be artistic fantasy which, "beginning with the relatively meager pragmatic world, weaves its own infinitely rich, manifold and inexhaustible world of detached works of being".¹⁸ The artist's task is the "imitation of the idea"; art are embodiments and realizations of ideas, their expressions (*vyraženie*) and transmission (*peredacha*) to the recipient (Probl.72).

Špet describes at other points in his essay the aspects of aesthetic experience which the artist and the art-recipient have in common: "We can attain to the aesthetic object just as well starting from the real as from the ideally conceivable object. The significance of this path is not cognitive ... it leads rather away from knowledge ... is entertaining, playful ... By distancing ourselves from the real things and moving into the sphere of the aesthetic object ... we are depriving them of their pragmatic qualities, we are not interested in knowledge of them. Consequently, we do not turn our attention to ideally conceivable relationships. If, on the other hand, we operate with ideally conceivable objects ... and if we wish to lend them aesthetic and vivid tangibility ..., we must turn to the perceivable outward appearance."¹⁹

An empirically giveable object is transformed by its release (*otřešenie*) from the pragmatic and causal contexts of the everyday world into an aesthetic object or a part of one. To this extent, the object earns the designation "removed" and "detached" (*otřešennoe bytie*).

The aesthetic term "*otřešenie*", crucial to the Russian phenomenologist, is intended to replace such concepts of contemporary aesthetics as "conscious illusion" (K.Lange), "abstraction" (W.Worringer) and "isolation" (R.Hamann) (Probl.70). The work of art is itself a detached aesthetic object, to the extent that it - in contrast to the things of everyday life which surround it - is removed from any practical application (Probl.67). Špet ascribes a detached being in a different sense to the objects portrayed in literature, painting and sculpture. Thus, he says of the characters and events within literary reality that they are subject neither to the ontological law of sufficient reason, as is the case for the empirical things of the extra-literary world, nor to the law of non-contradiction which holds for ideal (conceivable) objects (Probl.71).

Špet approaches with this thesis a modern conception of art according to which art objects possess an independent reality which is autonomous in relation to "nature". According to Cézanne, for example, whom Špet mentions as an exemplary representative of modern art (Ae.F.I 22), the artist does not create in imitation of nature, but rather parallel to it. This autonomy of artistically formed reality claimed by Cézanne receives an even more radical formulation in Russian Suprematism and Constructivism, as well as in the poetic theory of Russian Futurism.

Špet perceives the sovereignty of the artist as being limited to the extent that the artistically employed fantasy is held to be mimesis of ideas (Probl.72). In contrast to traditional platonic representational aesthetics, this does not mean that the essence of an object, which is only imperfectly realized within non-aesthetic reality, achieves the perfection of its form in the work of art. The function of the idea or the ideal structure upon which the artist orients himself is actually merely to stake out the creative boundaries of the medium of expression at the artist's disposal. Of course, not every empirically given object, detached from its pragmatic context and transformed into a representation of an ideal structure, leads to the constituting of an aesthetic object. Špet also subsumes individual scientific models, such as the atomic model and the explanatory fantasy images representing geometrical structures, under the concept of detached being (Probl. 72). The further specification of requirements for an object's being experienced as aesthetic Špet sees as being dependent upon a radical change in the starting point of Husserl's own phenomenological position. He believes it is necessary from the outset to describe the "natural world", which is the phenomenological starting point, as a social and cultural reality, and not primarily as an amorphous natural region in which culture and history only belatedly make their appearance: "What,

then, are these 'apples', 'trees', 'inkwells' and 'lamps' against which deep philosophical thought makes such a show of testing its strength as things of the real world ...? It is obvious that these things ... are acquired by the philosopher, that is, bought, exchanged, given to him as presents. Furthermore, someone produced ... cultivated them etc. and distributed them as goods and perishables. Their use is regulated by certain mores and legal norms and not only has work been invested in them, but also artistic fantasy ..."²⁰ It is only possible to view these objects as mere physical things by abstracting them from their socio-cultural reality (Probl.75).

It is Špet's intention to set apart from other objects of the social world the culturally significant objects in general, and specifically, works of art. Cultural objects stand out as being not merely tools and things useful to social life, but rather as having a certain way their own independent significance. A work of art, for example, gives expression to the artist's personality and shares correspondingly in the intrinsic value of his personal being: a work of art is "not only a social object and, as such, a means to something else, it is also a cultural 'value', to the extent that it functions as an index and a component of the fundamental category of culture ... that of the 'end-in-itself' the 'person'."²¹ In its capacity as an index for the artistically or culturally creative person, a cultural object refers beyond itself and is a sign with an expressive function. At the same time, it serves as the representational expression (*vyrazenie*) of the sense which is contained within it: cultural objects are "tools of spiritual creativity" and are thus "mere 'signs', which possess no self-sufficient being, but which refer to such being and thereby obtain their own meaning. The self-sufficient area of 'sense' to which they refer is the sphere of detached cultural being ..."²²

In these passages, the cultural object in general and in particular the work of art are focussed upon as symbolic structures, whereby the distinction between the expressive and the representational functions of signs becomes crucial, as is shown paradigmatically in the second part of the "Aesthetic Fragments" on the basis of the structure of "the word", that is, the verbal sign.

"In order to obtain the last specification of art as a possible object of the aesthetic consciousness, it is necessary to reveal the structure of art as that of an expression (*vyrazenie*)."²³

The aesthetic theory would then have to extract those components within the structure of the artistic expression which can function as bearers of aesthetic effect. Regrettably, the transition from art in general to poetry or literature in particular is only implied: the starting point, according to Špet, is the three sign functions of the "word", which is for these purposes prototypical for the sign structure of works of art. In addition to the expressive and the representational functions mentioned above, there is also the nominative function, as is exemplified in the naming of individual things. Depending upon which of these

functions is predominant, we can differentiate three types of arts: the primarily expressive arts, of which music is representative, poetry or literature, in which mainly the representational function is realized, and finally, the fine arts, which essentially "refer to things" (pokazyvajut veščī) and thus realize the nominative function of signs. Because of the fact that the expressive and nominative functions can each be fulfilled independently of the others, while the verbal portrayal of meaning structures can only be realized in conjunction with the other two functions, literature proves itself to be an excellent realization of the symbolic structure of art (Probl.77). "It is only in the structure of the word that *all* constructive 'parts' of the aesthetic object are present (nalico). The meaning is divided in music. In painting and sculpture, the eidetic object we wish to understand is obscured because the named objects press too far into the foreground."²⁴

Because Špet did not carry out his draft of a semiotic classification of the types of art beyond this point, we shall conclude at this point this portion of the discussion. Despite the fragmentary appearance Špet's aesthetics seem to have on the basis of the article just discussed, I believe that it should be clear from what has been said in just what way Špet intended to introduce the phenomenological analysis of aesthetic experience into the context of a semiotic cultural theory: he extends the previously-existing phenomenological description of the nature of the art-recipients's experience (Geiger 1913; Conrad 1914) with a phenomenology of artistic consciousness and, by revealing the sign-character of works of art, he clears the way for a reciprocally referential relationship between the perspectives of the practicing artist and the aesthetic recipient. The aesthetic experience of art is also placed within the greater context of the cultural consciousness wherein Husserl's early phenomenology, oriented towards natural objects and logical structures, is transformed into a phenomenology of the socio-cultural world of man.

3. Work-oriented and Recipient-oriented Analysis in Ingarden's and Špet's Aesthetics

The first attempts at applying the method of phenomenological description to the phenomena of art and the beautiful are attributable to Waldemar Conrad and Moritz Geiger. They were among those of Husserl's students in Göttingen and Munich who drew support for their positions primarily from the *Logical Investigations* and who were opposed to the explicitly transcendental-idealistic approach to phenomenology.

In his work on the *Aesthetic Object* (1908/09),²⁵ W. Conrad, one of Husserl's earliest students, concentrated on the structures of works belonging to the various

species of art, whereby he attempted to screen out the recipient's aesthetic experience. The Munich phenomenologist, *Moritz Geiger*, on the other hand, restricted his research in his *Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses* (1913) (*Contributions to a Phenomenology of Aesthetic Enjoyment*)²⁶ on the mode of experience of the percipient without going into detail on the nature of the aesthetic object. As divergent as the emphases of the phenomenological programs of W. Conrad and M. Geiger are, they nevertheless have in common the premiss that the application of the phenomenological method to aesthetics can be instrumented within two relatively autonomous fields of research. The structural description of aesthetic, and in particular artistic, objects is placed in juxtaposition to the manner in which they are perceived.

Ingarden and Špet also see the differentiation of aesthetics into an object-centered and an experience-centered part as central. Consequently, Ingarden's literary theory devolves to an "Ontology of the Literary work"²⁷, in which the mode of being and the structure of literary texts is described, and into an analysis of the relevant modes of knowledge and experience. While his book, published in 1931, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, is dedicated primarily to the analysis of ontological structures, Ingarden concentrates in his "O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego", first published in 1937²⁸, on the experience and the perception of the literature-recipient.

Much earlier, in his 1923 article *Problemy sovremennoj éstetiki*, G. Špet had cordoned off an "aesthetic ontology", concerned with the formal structures of aesthetic objects, from a "philosophical aesthetics" in a narrower sense, which in turn describes the modes of consciousness of the artist and the art-observer in which the works of art are experienced as aesthetic objects. He refers to the "aesthetic ontology" also as "philosophy of art" to the extent that the structure of the work of art is taken as a starting-point from which to define the aesthetic in general (Probl. 65). This methodological differentiation of an ontological structural analysis from a phenomenological analysis of the act of aesthetic perception is carried over into Špet's poetic theory in that the second part of the "Aesthetic Fragments" leads into a structural analysis of the poetic word, whereas it is not until the third part that he deals with the aesthetic view of literature. At the same time, the poetics, considered as the "Study of the sensual and inner forms of the (poetic) word", are to be included in the philosophy of art as an "ontological discipline" (Ae.F. II 71), while the inquiry into the aesthetically perceivable aspects of language in general and, specifically, artistic literature, is designated as the main area of interest of the "aesthetics of words" (compare Ae.F. II 70). Thus, paradoxical as it may be, Špet does not consider the poetics to belong at all to aesthetics in the strict sense of the word (compare Ae.F. 70).

To be precise, it must also be said that the Russian and the Polish phenomenologists' two-sided program, dividing work-oriented from recipient-oriented

analyses, draws a border that is actually permeable in one direction. Although - according to the program - the essential structures of the literary text can be described without reference to the reader's perception, the description of the reader's attitudes and experiences can only be carried out with reference to the structure of the work. In a phenomenological recipient-oriented analysis, the aesthetic experience is, namely, conceived of as intentional and directed towards the object.

A trait common to both Špet and Ingarden's phenomenological aesthetics is that they, in the course of executing their literary theoretical program for the structural description of texts, are repeatedly compelled to make reference to the possible effects of the texts upon the recipient and thus to trespass their own self-imposed limits.

In Ingarden's case, the drawing of and trespass of these limits occurs in the following manner:

In his ontological analysis of the literary work of art, he describes its many-layered construction: a literary text is viewed as a specific construct of sentences, in which a fictive world, consisting of objects, events and persons, is portrayed. On the basis of the "sentences", one can differentiate between components of expression and content, speech-sound patterns and units of meaning. We can also see that the world portrayed in literature is itself two-dimensional, if we consider that the objects invented in fictional sentences are not only characterized by the traits ascribed to them by the author, but also through the perspectives and points of view by means of which they are portrayed. Thus, literary works can be described as structures consisting of four layers: the speech-sound patterns, the units of meaning and their arrangement, the schematized perspectives designed to present the objects portrayed in the work and the layer of objective realities depicted.

Ingarden then places this four-layered structure as a schematic, that is to say incomplete, framework in juxtaposition to the various ways in which this structure is realized by different readers according to their respective dependence on their culturally and socially pre-conditioned perceptions. The aspects and perspectives suggested in the literary text are more or less fully actualized in the process of reading. The events and persons invented by the author receive a different "painting-in" and completion with every reading. Ingarden refers to this as the filling-in of spaces of indeterminacy.²⁹

In this way, the Polish phenomenologist indirectly admits that essential aspects of the structure of a literary work, which after all was to be considered "purely unto itself", could only be determined with reference to possible actualizations and concretions on the part of the reader. This is because the perspectives within which the author invents literary processes can be defined as merely potential aspects which remain to be actualized by the reader, and the indeterminacy inhe-

rent in the events and portrayal of persons in fictional texts can only be seen as such with reference to the consciousness of the reader that is able to fill out these indeterminacies.

Both at the level of the general theory of art and at that of literary theory, it can be shown that Špet does not carry out a purely ontologically oriented structural analysis of art in his aesthetics.

Thus, as we have seen, when dealing with the question of the specific mode of being of the aesthetic object, which differs equally from real as well as from ideal objects, he falls back upon the aesthetic attitude of the viewer, that is, upon the process of "detachment" (*otrešenje*) of an object from its pragmatic and causal contexts. An art object that was not subjected to this isolating approach focussing primarily on the descriptive understanding of its structure would not even appear as an aesthetic object.

Špet falls back on this aspect even in his theory of poetic speech, in which it is especially important for him to ignore the reader's or listener's perception. The starting-point of his poetics is the hypothesis of three different linguistic functions which must be fulfilled by every type of speech, while, in every case, one of the functions will dominate the other two: the objective-communicative function (*so-obščajuščaja funkcija*), which is characteristic of scientific speech, the expressive function (*ekspresivnaja funkcija*), dominant in rhetorical speech, and the poetic, or in other words, the creative speech-structuring function (*poëtičeskaja funkcija*)³⁰. When the latter dominates, a speech-construct is conceived as an aesthetic object. In this case, speech is composed in a manner which directs the reader's attention to the form of the linguistic communication. Whereas the formation of the expressive level of every-day communicative language serves primarily the structuring of the stated sense and thereby the communication of facts, all the levels of language employed in poetic speech attain a relatively independent meaning: the rhythmic forms and syntactic characteristics of the speech should become evident, as well as the author's newly-formed sense-relationships.

To the extent that Špet falls back in this way upon the author's communicative intent in poetic speech, and that this intent includes a definite influencing of the reader's attitude, he is also compelled to anticipate in his structural description of the poetic word the (possible or desired) mode in which literary texts are perceived.

The fact that both the Russian and the Polish phenomenologist stray from their original program of carrying out ontological structural descriptions independently of a recipient-oriented analysis can be viewed as a fruitful inconsistency within their aesthetic theories in that it represents a transition to a methodologically more advanced concept of phenomenology.

To a certain extent, in removing themselves from their original program by inadvertently conjoining textual and receptive analysis, Ingarden and Špet have

reconstructed Husserl's own transition from the early phenomenological approach of the *Logical Investigations* in 1900/01 to the classical form of the phenomenological method of the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*, in 1913. The early conception of phenomenology, as a description of experiences of consciousness set beside an ontological analysis of the corresponding structures of objects, transforms itself into a correlative description of forms of consciousness and of objects. In this way, both phenomenologists also anticipate the insight of the newer phenomenologically oriented "recipient-oriented aesthetics",³¹ according to which the primary subject of research in literary science was neither the literary text viewed in isolation, nor the reading process as such, but was rather the text as it unfolds in the process of reading, a comprehensive process which encompasses the two poles of the artistic text as created by the author, and at the same time, the act of concretion performed by the reader.

Notes

- 1 The Russian reception of Husserl's work from its inception by Špet in 1914 to 1930 is to a great extent a "phenomenological movement in the strict sense". This expression is used here in the sense given by Herbert Spiegelberg in *The Phenomenological Movement*, The Hague, 1982, pp. 5 - 6. Discussions concerning the nature of language and of art formed the focal point of the Russian phenomenological writings appearing during this period. The most important phenomenologically inspired writings on aesthetics in Russia were Špet's *Ėstetičeskie fragmenty* (Pg. 1922-23) and Aleksej Losev's *Fenomenologija čistoj muzyki*, written in 1920/21 and published in his *Muzyka kak predmet logiki* in 1927. For a detailed analysis of Špet's and Losev's Phenomenology, see: A. Haardt, *Husserl in Rußland*, which will be published in 1991 by the Fink-Verlag in Munich.
- 2 During the academic year 1912/13, Špet was enrolled at the University of Göttingen. From his report on his Göttingen period, it is clear that among other courses, Špet had visited Husserl's class on "Natur und Geist" during the Winter Term of 1912/13 (CGAGM, fd. MGU, f. 418). Roman Ingarden had visited Husserl's lectures and classes in Göttingen from Winter Term 1912/13 until Summer Term 1914. Cf. Kari Schuhmann, *Husserl Chronik*, The Hague 1977, p. 173.
- 3 Gustav Špet, *Ėstetičeskie fragmenty I-III*, Petrograd, 1922-23 (Reprinted in G.G. Špet: *Sočinenija*, M. 1989, p. 343 - 472).
- 4 Gustav Špet, *Problemy sovremennoj ėstetiki*, Iskusstvo, 1923, Nr.1, Moskva, 1923, p. 43 - 78). (Cited in the following as *Probl.*)
- 5 Cf. Semen L. Frank, *Iz istorii russkoj filosofskoj mysli konca 19ogo i načala 20ogo veka*, Antologija, Washington, 1965, p. 6.

- 6 Thus, P.D. Jurkevič, the founder of the "Moscow School of Metaphysics", views the formal object of his metaphysics as a Platonic "idea" (Jurkevič, P. D., *Ideja*. Ž.M.N.P. (1859) 104. Otd. II. p. 1 - 35. See esp. p. 5.) Solov'ev sees the high point of Greek philosophy in Plato's discovery of the "ideal world of true being" (Solov'ev SS II p. 408), S. N. Trubeskoj sees the problem of universals as developed by Aristoteles and Plato as being the fundamental question in philosophy (Trubeskoj SS II, p. 3). Frank employs here the term ("moskovskaja metafizičeskaja škola" and includes in it L. M. Lopatin and S. N. Trubeskoj. Due to the close relationship between their thought and the philosophy of Vl. Solov'ev, and thus also to P. D. Jurkevič's, we can include these thinkers in the abovementioned current in Russian philosophy as well.
- 7 Gustav Špet, *Javlenie i smysl. Fenomenologija kak osnovnaja nauka i ee problema*, Moscow, 1914. An English translation of this work by Thomas Nemeth will be published in 1991 in the series *Phenomenologica* (Špet's book will be cited in the following as "JS".)
- 8 See G.Špet, *Istorija kak problema logiki. Kritičeskie i metodologičeskie issledovanija*. Čast' pervaja: Materialy, Moscow, 1916, p.VII.
- 9 See note 2.
- 10 See E.Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, 1.Buch, Halle a.S., 1913, §§ 129-135.
- 11 However, at some places in JS, it is stated that only certain types of objects - like organism and utensils - are constituted by "hermeneutic acts". (Compare especially JS, p. 207).
- 12 Gustav Špet, *Germenevtika i ee problema*. This text was completed by Špet 6 July 1918. One typewritten copy of the text is kept in the Špet-Archive of the Manuscript Department of the Moscow Lenin Library (Rukopisnyi Otdel' Leninskoj Biblioteki, Fond Nr. 718, G. G. Špet), another typewritten copy, which Špet himself has prepared for print, is kept in the Špet-Archive of Mrs. Elena Vl. Pasternak. A part of the last-named manuscript has been edited recently by A. A. Mitjušin in *Kontekst*, 1989, pp. 231-268. An English translation worked from the manuscript kept in the Špet-Archive of Mrs. Pasternak will be published in 1991 in *Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, ed. G. L. Kline, a German version will appear in the same year, ed. A. Haardt and R. Daube-Schackat and published in Alber-Verlag.
- 13 Gustav Špet, *Predmet i zadači etničeskoj psihologii. Psihologičeskoe obozrenie*, 1917. I. Part One: Nr. 1, p. 27-59. Part Two: Nr. 2, p. 233-263. Part Three: Nr. 3-4, p. 405-420.
- 14 See Špet. op.cit., part Two, p. 243. Špet here hypothetically introduces a discipline, which is to investigate language, myths, mores, and science as

forms of expression of systems of meaning. Špet mentions in this connection A.Marty's *Allgemeine Semasiologie* and makes references to Husserl's *Idee einer allgemeinen apriorischen Grammatik*.

- 15 e.g. A.Marthy's *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, Halle a.S., 1908, Vol. 1.
- 16 See G.Špet, *Germenevtika i ee problemy*, p. 215.
- 17 See Probl. 57: "Oni proizvol'no gipostazirujut v real'noe to, čto imeet značenie tol'ko ideal'noe, tol'ko vozmožnoe, a zatem iz éтого kvazi-real'nogo sozdajut osobyi vtoroj mir, otličajuščijsja ot dejstvitel'no dannogo, nas okružfjuščego, mir, po predstavlenju metafizikov, bolee pročny i potomu bolee real'ny, čem naš ..."
- 18 See Probl. 71: "Ne kasajas' ... dejstvija fantazii, pozvoljajuščego ej tkat' iz élementov sravnitel'no bednogo pragmatičeskogo mira svoj beskonečno bogatyi, mnogoobrazny, neiščerpaemnyj mir bytija otrešennogo ..."
- 19 See Probl. 69-70: "K éstetičeskomy že predmetu my možem priiti odinakovo udobno i ot dejstvitel'nogo predmeta i ot ideal'nogo myslimogo. Smysl éтого puti otnjud' ne poznavatel'ny, a skoree ... ego možno nazvat' otvlekajuščim ot poznanija ... razvlekajuščim, igrajuščim ... Otchodja ot veščej dejstvitel'nych i perechodja v sferu éstetičeskogo predmeta, my sovlekaem s veščej ich pragmatičeskiju oboločku, lišaem ich pragmatičeskich kačestv, no ne imeem v vidu ich poznanija i ne obraščаемsja sootvetstvenno k ustanovke na ideal'no-myslimye otnošenija. Obratno, operiruja s ideal'no-myslimymi predmetami ..., my operiruem s nimi, kak s predmetami, obnažennymi ot vsjakoj 'éstetičesknoj' vnešnosti, i nam nepremenno nužno obrat'sja k poslednej, čtoby pridat' im éstetičeskiju žiznennuju osjazatel'nost' i dejstvitel'nost'."
- 20 See Probl. 75: "Čto takoe vse te 'jabloki', 'derev'ja', 'černil'nicy', 'lampy' i vsjakogo roda utenzilii, na kotorych izoščrjaetsja filosofskoe glubokomyšlie, kak na 'primerach' veščej dejstvitel'nogo mira ...? Ne trudno videt', čto éti vešči priobreteny filosofom, t.e. kupleny, vymeneny, polučeny v podarok itd., zatem oni kem-nibud' proizvedeny, sdelany, vraščeny itd., puščeny v oborot, kak tovar, kak predmet potreblenija, pol'zovanie imi opredeljaetsja tem ili inym obučaem i normoju prava, nakonec, v nich vkladyvaetsja ne tol'ko trud, no i tvorčeskaja fantazija ..."
- 21 See Probl. 76: "Ono [iskusstvo] ne tol'ko social'naja vešč i kak takaja, sredstvo, no takže kul'turnaja 'cennost', buduči indeksom i kak by 'sostavnoju čast'ju' osnovnoj kul'turnoj kategorii ... 'samoceli', 'lica', 'ličnost'."
- 22 See Probl. 75: "Kak orudija i sredstva oni sut' tol'ko 'znaki', samodovlejuščego bytija ne imejuščie, no ukazujuščie na takovoe i čerez éto priobretfjuščie sobstvennoe značenie. Ukazyvaemfja imi samodovlejuščaja oblast' 'smysla' i est' oblast' otrešennogo kul'turnogo bytija ..."

- ²³ See Probl. 77: "Čto by polučit' poslednjuju specifikaciju iskusstva kak vozmožnogo predmeta éstetičeskogo soznanija, neobchodimo raskryt' i analizirovat' strukturu samogo iskusstva, kak vyraženijsja.
- ²⁴ See Ae.F. I 20: "Tol'ko v strukture slova nalico vse konstruktivnye 'časti' éstetičeskogo predmeta. V muzyke otščepłajaetsja smysl, v živopisi, skul'pture, zatemnijaetsja urazumevaemyj predmet (sliškom vystupajut 'nazyvaemye' vešč'i)."
- ²⁵ Conrad Waldemar, "Der ästhetische Gegenstand. Eine phänomenologische Studie", in: *Z. f. Ä. u. Allg. Kunstws.* III 1908, p. 71-118; III 1908, p. 469 - 511; IV 1909, p. 400 - 455.
- ²⁶ Moritz Geiger, "Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses", in: *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* I. 1913, p. 567-684.
- ²⁷ See Roman Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*. 3. durchgesehene Auflage. Tübingen 1965, p. 18.
- ²⁸ Roman Ingarden, *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego*. Lwów 1937.
- ²⁹ See Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*. Transl. by George G. Grobowicz. Evanston 1973, § 38.
- ³⁰ See Ae.F. II 29 where Špet introduces the objective-communicative function (soobščajuščaja funkcija). The expressive function (ékspressivnaja funkcija) implicates Bühler's appellative function (Ae. F. II 7, Ae. F. II 112). For the poetic function see Ae. F. II 66.
- ³¹ See esp.: Wolfgang Iser, *Der Akt des Lesens. Theorie ästhetischer Wirkung*. München, 1976.