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**FREUD AND BAKHTIN'S DOSTOEVSKY:
IS THERE A BAKHTINIAN FREUD WITHOUT VOLOSHINOV?**

Our panel has variously been listed as "Illness and Creativity" and "Dostoevsky and Freud"; the common ground of both seems to be a concern with various models of the psyche and their implications for Dostoevsky as a writer, a philosopher, and an epileptic. One way or the other, as analyst, patient, or victim, Dostoevsky is presumed to have been a "psychologizer" of life. My paper will discuss that claim by considering one aspect of the secondary, or perhaps it is the tertiary, literature on Dostoevsky: what Mikhail Bakhtin did not like about Freud, and how that dislike came to influence his reading of Dostoevsky.

It must be emphasized at the outset that this image of a "Bakhtinian Freud" has nothing to do with the well-known polemic against Freudianism written in 1927 by Bakhtin's friend and associate Valentin Voloshinov (*Frejdzizm: Kritičeskij očerk*). As I and others have argued elsewhere, the so-called "disputed texts", that is, the Marxist and semiotic books authored by members of Bakhtin's circle and frequently attributed to Bakhtin, are, judging by the available evidence, the work of the persons who actually signed them.¹ *Freudianism* is not the sort of book Bakhtin would have written in the mid-1920s. Voloshinov was indisputably a Marxist, and believed in dialectics; Bakhtin was not. Voloshinov was interested above all in achieving some objective explanation of inner experience, and this he hoped to accomplish through the sign (in this sense he was a semiotician); Bakhtin almost never made reference to signs (znaki) in his writings, and was critical of the tendency of signs to come together into codes. Bakhtin had no patience with dialectical reasoning; in fact, he routinely opposed dialictics to dialogue. As he put the case in two of his most celebrated notebook jottings from the early 1970s:

Dialogue and dialectics. Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgments from living words and responses, cram everything into one abstract consciousness - and that's how you get dialectics.

Context and code. A context is potentially unfinalized; a code must be finalized. A code is only a technical means of transmitting information, but it does not have cognitive, creative significance. A code is a deliberately established killed context.²

In a recent article on "The Bakhtin Circle's Freud",³ Gerald Pirog contributes to the cause of "deconflating" Bakhtin and Voloshinov by demonstrating - among much else - that Voloshinov's critique of Freudianism is itself very much in the spirit of its discredited target. It is, Pirog claims, much more materialist and "objectively scientific" than anything Bakhtin would have undertaken:

Objectification for Bakhtin results in domination and control [Pirog writes]; For Voloshinov, on the other hand, the issue is precisely one of defining "inner experience" objectively". His goal is to make all inner experience outer experience of better, public experience .. through his equation of the inner psyche with the sign" (596).

Thus, Pirog concludes, "Voloshinov's explicit focus on the *semiotically mediated* institutional settings in which the productive activity of men and women takes place is grounded in a determinism no less inclusive than the biological determinism he accuses Freud of promoting." Laws governing this activity could presumably be discovered "through the 'objective' methods of dialectical materialism" (597).

This struggle for objectivity and the concomitant tolerance for "determinism" has a curious effect on Voloshinov's reading of Freud. Pirog suggests that this attitude might account for Voloshinov's inability to discuss pathology except in terms of "animality" (598) - and, one might add, it also makes difficult any discussion of what for Freud was a "healthful pathology", namely, creativity.

The unwarranted assumption that Bakhtin is the real author of Voloshinov's books has not only resulted in refashioning Bakhtin as a Marxist, which he was not. It has also worked to obscure Bakhtin's own subtler polemic against Freudian-style thought.⁴ In the 1920s, Bakhtin did not engage in direct debate with psychologists and psychoanalysts - as did Voloshinov - because, for him, the problem of the self was not strictly a psychological problem but more broadly a philosophical one. As he wrote in his early essay "Avtor i geroi":

Проблема души ... не может быть проблемой психологии, науки безоценочной и казуальной, ибо душа, хотя развивается и становится во времени, есть индивидуальное, ценностное и свободное целое.⁵

Bakhtin detected something "non-evaluative" and "causal" about psychology - something, as he put it, that was opposed to the "soul", which was "individual and free". In his book on Dostoevsky, Bakhtin cites with approval Dostoevsky's assertion that, in spite of all the psychological insight of his novels, he was *not* a psychologist.⁶ Even Dostoevsky's protagonists are invited to join the attack. Bakhtin mentions, as an example, Stavrogin's outburst in Tikhon's cell:

"Слушайте, я не люблю лигионов и психологов, по крайней мере таких, которые в мою душу лезут." Bakhtin immediately adds that the accusation was unfair; Tikhon in fact was approaching Stavrogin dialogically. Alone among the many who cluster about Stavrogin, the old man is neither frightened nor impressed; he understands the "unfinalizability of his inner personality" [незавершенность его внутренней личности] (70).

In this example from "Бесы", then, Bakhtin opposes "psychology" to one of his key concepts and most precious values, незавершенность. I would suggest that this opposition to psychology that Bakhtin foists so vigorously upon Dostoevsky is more significant and far-ranging than a mere reference to the well-documented aversion that Dostoevsky had for legal investigative psychology, the "палка о двух концах". Rather, it is Bakhtin himself who is against psychology, and this prejudice is reflected in his thinking about the self from his earliest writings to the end of his career. It was this faintly "determinist" approach to the mind that made some Russian thinkers of the 1920s - notably the young Alexander Luria - attempt a synthesis of Freudianism and Marxism, and precisely this factor marked Bakhtin's dislike of both.⁷ The fact that both Freudianism and Marxism presented themselves as scientific *systems* doubtless deepened Bakhtin's suspicions.

We may note another crucial difference between Bakhtin's many approaches to the mind and Freud's. Bakhtin always avoided invoking an unconscious as Freud understood it. To be sure, Bakhtin - like his associate Voloshinov and like their contemporary, the developmental psychologist Lev Vygostky - did not believe (and who ever has?) that we are fully aware of the implications of our actions, and that everything we do emerges in a controlled fashion from the center of our attention. But rather than invoke an unconscious, these Russian thinkers were more likely to turn to the dynamics of memory and habit. Most important, they resisted the notion of a separate and inaccessible structure out of which our impulses, fears, and surprises emerge, and argued instead for a richer and more varied picture of consciousness. As Bakhtin was to write in the early 1960s when revising his book on Dostoevsky: "Сознание гораздо страшнее всяких бессознательных комплексов".⁸

Both Bakhtin and Freud invoke Dostoevsky as an illustration of their very different theories of the mind. This is not surprising: Dostoevsky's novels contain sufficient support for a Freudian theory of the unconscious as well as for a description of the mind in terms of dialogue and inner speech. But in each case, crucial aspects of Dostoevsky are overlooked. Thus Freud can react with bemused dismay to Dostoevsky's invocations of a theologically based human freedom, and Bakhtin offers a rather benign account of all those pathologies and perversities we now call "Dostoevskian".

What, then, is a conscious self as Bakhtin understands it? In his early writings

Bakhtin deals with the self in three related categories.⁹ First there is the "I-for-myself" "я-для-себя": how my self looks and feels to my own consciousness. Then there are two categories of outsideness and otherness, "I-for-others" ("я-для-других", how my self appears to those outside it), and "the-other-for-me" ("другой-для-меня", how outsiders appear to my own self). Working with this triad - so different from the three-part model that Freud had devised - Bakhtin poses a number of questions about selfhood. He asks, first, how a self establishes a relationship to the world.

Bakhtin begins by rejecting the traditional subject-object opposition as fundamentally flawed. It cannot be drawn, he says, because there exists neither a stable self nor a stable "given" world to which that self might be opposed. Rather, the world *becomes* determinate and concrete for us only through our willed relationship with it; in this sense, he writes, "наше отношение определяет предмет и его структуру, но не обратно" (AiG, 8). It follows that our environment seems most arbitrary and alien to us not when we create or perceive the wrong relationship with the world, but when we refuse to have any relationship with the world at all. Bakhtin calls those who refuse to commit to a relationship in the world "pretenders", самозванцы,¹⁰

His use of the word is curious. Normally a самозванец tries to usurp someone else's place; in Bakhtin's usage, a pretender is a person who tries to live in no particular place at all, or from a purely abstract, generalized, pre-scripted place. Dostoevsky, we might note, created several pretenders of this sort: Stavrogin, with his compelling and yet weirdly unreal masks, forever generating ideas that inspire others but leave him cold and uncommitted, is one good example. Such characters are all doomed.

Bakhtin's vigilance against pretendership explains the enormous role he allots to the *body* as a carrier or marker for the self. Since no other self can ever be in my precise time and space, nor see and do what my self can see and do, each relationship and each event is genuinely singular. Thus Bakhtin has little interest in - and perhaps no real knowledge of - those emotions that figure so prominently in most narratives of the psyche: jealousy, nostalgia, anxiety, regret. Only I can do what I can do from where I am, and only I answer for it. For Bakhtin, the primary values are always non-fusion, interaction, and willingness to take responsibility (which is quite independent of the question of blame).

How are these meditations on personal ethics connected to aesthetic creativity, and how does all this measure up against more psychoanalytic methods for reading Dostoevsky? Freudian models of the self also rely on the body, to be sure, but the body in that context is more a source of standardized somatic demands than of "singularities". In Bakhtin's view, the singularities are what matter - that is, the ways in which bodies radically *differ* from each other, not the number of scenarios they can be shown to share. Physical embodiment, and the

unique delimitation of each person vis-a-vis other persons that results from it, are in fact as central to Bakhtin's ideas about the production of art as they are to his thinking about the formation of a self. Bakhtin distinguishes aesthetic creativity from other sorts of human activity (such as the cognitive, the ethical, the religious) in terms of differentiated embodiment, that is, the distribution within that activity of *authors* (creators) and *heroes* (created persons).¹¹ In the pure rationation of cognitive events, Bakhtin claims, there is no hero; in ethical events, author and hero coincide; in religious events, the hero is transcendental; only in the aesthetic event are there two distinct consciousnesses engaged in some sort of dialogue. Ultimately Bakhtin will suggest that successful selves are in fact formed like novels - and that Dostoevsky, perhaps the world's most successful novelist, offers the richest scenarios for self-building. To focus this thesis, I would like to contrast Bakhtin's psychology of the creative act with Freud's more familiar psychoanalytic model.

We recall that Freud distinguishes real, lived experience from three other activities that he groups together in one category: play, daydreams or fantasy, and art.¹² "The opposite of play is not what is serious, but what is real", Freud observes. "The creative writer does the same as the child at play. He creates a world of fantasy which he takes very seriously ... while separating it sharply from reality." The creative impulse in art, Freud surmises, results from a repression of fantasy, and the pleasure we feel in creating or viewing art compensates us for some unrealized desire. In other words, art, play, and fantasy all arise from a *Jack*: "We may lay it down," Freud concludes, "that a happy person never fantasizes, only an unsatisfied one."

Bakhtin challenges this approach to the creative process on almost every level. For him, "aesthetic activity" - that is, authoring others and being authored - is utterly routine activity, and thus to live at all is to create. The larger, more noticeable acts we honor with the name "creative" are simply extensions of the sorts of activity we do all the time. Freud, Bakhtin would say, partakes of the romantic tendency to regard creativity and inspiration as exceptional events. And to see creativity as redirected unhappiness or a healthful use of a potential pathology is to misunderstand the very nature of daily human activity. Although some creativity may indeed be "Freudian", as a rule it is positive, conscious, and the result of work undertaken by the whole personality. Furthermore, since personalities develop through interaction with others, creativity, like the formation of an individual unrepeatable self, is a special kind of *social* act.

Not surprisingly, Bakhtin's description of fantasy also differs markedly from Freud's - and this would explain, perhaps, why Bakhtin routinely interprets fantasy in Dostoevsky not "physiologically" or pathologically but, as it were, more the result of social and dialogic deprivation. For Bakhtin, fantasy, although a somewhat astheticized activity, is not only perfectly normal but also an activity

requiring no repression and generating no guilt. In his own early discussions of the relationship between life and art (AiG, 67-68), Bakhtin does *not* oppose real experience to a triumvirate of dreams, fantasy, and art. Rather he classifies real experience, dreams, and fantasy *together*, and distinguishes all three as a group *from art*.

Bakhtin's reasons for calling dreams and fantasies "real life" can be found in his initial three-part model of the self, its mix of *я-для-себя*, *я-для-других*, and *другой-для-меня*. What characterizes *both* life and fantasy, Bakhtin claims, is "inner self-sensation", that is, the absence of an "outward expressed quality" to the self. Neither our life as we live it for ourselves, nor our fantasies as we dream them for ourselves, can finalize or consummate the primary actor, the I-for-myself (AiG, 67). Others I can see, Bakhtin notes, but myself I can only sense as acting. In a dream, too, I can only sense myself acting; only when I *retell* a dream or a fantasy can it become finalized or (in Bakhtin's sense) artistic.

Retelling an inner sensation to another (and outside) party serves to invest the hero of the experience with a real body, and the body with "surroundings" (AiG, 28). Once something has a body, Bakhtin argues, the artist can be "outside" it and the aesthetic act is born. Alone, fantasy cannot give rise to art. It remains an "inner imitation", able to "imagine" but not to "impart an image" to anything - because it allows for no genuinely embodied other consciousness (AiG, 67).

Bakhtin does not illustrate this point, but he seems to have in mind the sort of dilemma Dostoevsky explores in his early portraits of "doubles" and "dreamers". The *мечтатель* from "Белые ночи" is an excellent example of the paradoxes, dangers, and dynamics of fantasy without consummation. Far from being a mawkish sentimental tale, or even the parody of such a tale, it is a case study in "psychological otherlessness", in the refusal to risk genuine encounters with the other's finalizing power. The Underground Man, of course, is the pathological culmination of this type.

Bakhtin's passion for exposing doubles and dreamers gives us a clue to his preference for the *early* rather than the late Dostoevsky. It has often been pointed out that *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* devotes an extraordinary amount of space to themes and texts from Dostoevsky's preexile and middle periods, and deals rather cursorily with the long mature novels. The late Dostoevsky, after all, was receptive to the cosmic mysticism of Soloviev and Fyodorov, and several entries in *Diary of a Writer* profess sympathy not only for an unconscious but also a "collective national unconscious" that appears to unfold in history.¹³ In short, it appears to have been important to Bakhtin's own concept of what art should do that both he and Dostoevsky were "not psychologists", that is, not willing to approach the soul dialectically, causally, and from within. Both had to be "realists in the higher sense", that is, willing to approach the self dialogically, to recognize its unfinalizability, and to confirm that selves can be creative only in

response to images of themselves given by *others*.

This model of the self is, of course, a sort of rough draft for the polyphonic word. Like its verbal counterpart, it has no special interest - and certainly no exclusive interest - in replication or annihilation, that is, in sex and death. It is interested solely in learning and creating. From this fact, perhaps, stems Bakhtin's remarkable inability to appreciate texts of true rage or psychological paralysis. Dostoevsky's vision of the world, in contrast to Bakhtin's domestication of him, is a more radically divided and radically unresolvable one - and not in the benignly dialogic or estatically carnivalesque sense of the word. By all indications, the mature Dostoevsky really believed in the ultimate innerness of guilt, just as he believed in ultimate closure, the Apocalypse.

To close, then, by bringing Dostoevsky, Freud and Bakhtin together on the question of creating and created selves. For Bakhtin, the self is not divided into a conscious and an unconscious, nor is it shaped by the "socialization" of an originally "individual" self. The whole idea of an initial self forced to accommodate its fantasies and desires to the realities of social pressure was for Bakhtin a typical product of Western psychological thought, Freudian and other. And the related idea that aesthetic activity is a sort of byproduct, a compensatory distraction that helps reconcile us to the collapse of our fantasies, seemed to Bakhtin cynically dismissive of the active, socially responsible role that art is destined to play in life. But if it is not repression, sublimation, non-negotiable biological drives and the considerations of reality versus pleasure that generate and organize art, then what does?

Bakhtin does not provide a neat programmatic statement beyond the general comments on aesthetic activity already discussed. But I suggest that one can find a clue to Bakhtin's thinking on the subject in the concept of the *dominant*, the доминанта, that he invokes at several points in his book on Dostoevsky. This is not the "dominant" as appropriated from German aestheticians by the Russian Formalists, who used it to measure degrees of language deformation in poetry. It is, rather, a more "organic" and biological concept - here the parallel with Freudian models is intriguing - developed by the great Russian physiologist, religious thinker and Dostoevsky enthusiast, the same man who gave Bakhtin the idea of the chronotope: Alexei Ukhtomsky.¹⁴

The case cannot be developed here in detail (it is, in any event, being pursued by others¹⁵), but one should note that Ukhtomsky's "dominant" is an organizing principle for the relationships of both body and soul - in fact, it might be said that the dominant is what keeps bodies and souls together. Although Ukhtomsky originally developed the idea to explain the lability, or instability, of cortical excitation and inhibition,¹⁶ he himself extended the idea to interpersonal relations and then to literature, where he invoked Dostoevsky as key exemplar.

What did the concept of a "dominant" mean, then, when employed by a

physiologist? Ukhtomsky asked himself that question in his 1927 essay "The Dominant as a Factor in Behavior", and traced his use of it to Richard Avenarius, founder of empiriocriticism and advocate of a biological approach to cognition. In Ukhtomsky's paraphrase of Avenarius, the dominant in any organism is the "transformer of an ongoing reaction, the factor directing the behavior of an animal under given conditions ... the one who detachedly lies in wait and watches out for [new] impulses and irritants" that might help in resolving a given problem.¹⁷ For Avenarius, the dominant functions as an exception in the reflexes of an organism, which was properly governed by the principle of economy of effort.

Ukhtomsky takes the concept further. First he sharply distinguishes the dominant from "instinct" (88). Then he insists that the law of economy of effort does *not* apply (because the most powerful drives of an organism are toward nourishment and work). Finally, he defines the activity of the dominant as the norm, not the exception, in healthy organisms.

Central to Ukhtomsky's reasoning is his definition of an "organ", which, he argues, is not something "morphologically cast, constant, with fixed static signs" (79). Rather an organ is more like a process, a dynamic mechanism with a certain specific activity to perform in an ever-changing environment. Organs are in best working order when they are maximally receptive to a creative interruption of their established and successful reflexes.

Our dominant, then, is our insurance that our problems can be resolved flexibly with the help of resources from within our own organism. But how does our dominant, this "transformer" ever on the alert, interact with the dominants of other living things? At the end of his essay Ukhtomsky ponders the social implications:

Каждую минуту нашей деятельности огромные области живой и неповторимой реальности проскакивают мимо нас только потому, что доминанты наши направлены в другую сторону. В этом смысле наши доминанты стоят между нами и реальностью. (90)

As an example of those defeated by their own dominants, Ukhtomsky considers the "poet, scholar and thinker" who tend toward a self-enclosed life, who move through the world "defeated by their own theory" with "one and the same stationary, monotonously governing orientation" (91). Their creative activity does indeed proceed with an economy of effort. But the "chronotope of genius" works in another way, he claims (87). It seeks precisely the path of greatest resistance, response, interruption: "the more powerful the dominant that governs behavior, the more it will prevail over the negative tendency to rest, self-satisfaction, to a breathing spell" (87). For, Ukhtomsky concludes, "we have absolutely no grounds for concluding that reality and truth will become at some

time a cushion of tranquility ... Our [neurological] organization is designed in principle for constant movement, dynamics, constant tries and construction of projects, and also for continual verification, disappointment, and mistakes" (93). And this is because "the givens [of the world] expect from us not passive perception but a passionate search for what should be. *We are not observers but participants in existence.* Our behavior is work" (94).

Ukhtomsky concludes his essay with a meditation on happiness. If human happiness is to exist at all,

... оно будет возможно в самом деле только после того, как будущий человек сможет воспитать в себе эту способность переключения в жизнь другого человека... когда воспитается в каждом из нас доминанта *на лицо другого.* (95)

It should come as no surprise that Ukhtomsky sought illustration of these "physiological" laws in the works of Dostoevsky.

In an entry in his personal notebooks from the late 1920s on the topic of *The Brothers Karamazov*, Ukhtomsky defined a person's "dominant" as his "integral image of the world", "его образ мира ... и лицо для других".¹⁸ If allowed to function undisturbed, a person's dominant - the product of habit and accumulated behavior patterns - could only generate its own double. Apparently this prospect haunted Ukhtomsky as much as it haunted Bakhtin. In a letter to a friend in 1918 Ukhtomsky wrote, apropos of Dostoevsky's short novel "Двойник":

"Знаете ли, что, может быть, труднее всего для человека освободиться от Двойника, от автоматической наклонности видеть в каждом встречном самого себя, свои пороки, свои недостатки, свое тайное уродство ... только с этого момента, как преодолен будет Двойник, открывается свободный путь к собеседнику!" (117)

As a 'sobesednik', the primary obligation we have to others is to deliver them from their own dominants. The dominant here has little to do with its Formalist counterpart, which is a willed hierarchy of devices or forms that an author structures, defends, and imposes intact on readers. Ukhtomsky's charge - to the non-literary real world and to authors and readers alike - is that they construct dominants designed to be *challenged* and undermined. As Ukhtomsky puts it, our task is to "переменить в человеке его физиологическое восприятие, физиологическую привычность, непрерывность его жизни" (119). To do so requires above all слух, an acute sense of hearing or of listening, which Ukhtomsky considered the most crucial human sense.

In 1924, Ukhtomsky summed up Dostoevsky's contributions to art in three

"laws". These were the laws of the dominant, of the *заслуженный собеседник* or interlocutor who fulfils his duty by interrupting and changing the other, and the law of compassion, *милосердие* (119). Such are the psychological "laws" that Bakhtin also values, and that he also sees illustrated in Dostoevsky.

Here, then, in collaboration with Ukhtomsky, might we find Bakhtin's "negative image of Freud". It is certainly not to be sought in the crude and politically opportunistic polemic against psychoanalysis that Voloshinov penned in 1927.¹⁹ Nor should it be sought in an attack on Freud's "somaticization of the psyche", for as we have seen, Bakhtin also "somaticizes" the inner world, although in a different way. Resistance to Freud is, rather, an organic part of Bakhtin's larger worldview, in which pride of place is given to open-ended dialogue, long messy novels, and centrifugal rather than centripetal forces. The particular doctrines of psychoanalysis mattered less to Bakhtin, it seems, than Freud's very style of thought.

At the base of that thought is the assumption that the self and the psyche is a riddle. Riddles, of course, depend for their effectiveness on the belief that the world is a system, that everything in it has a meaning that can be related to some "whole" if only we could remember all the parts, or trick the censor, or uncover the code. That style of thought, with its repressions, suppressions, and Freudian slips, rules out the very possibility that mental events could simply be a mess, that is, truly accidental, menaingless, and unrelated. For unless there is a pretty good chance of things not fitting together, and a pretty good chance that important aspects of the self are routinely available for change, there is nothing for the outside person or *собеседник* "interrupting" us to contribute that is genuinely new. The emphasis is rather on a backward process, a return to fixed scenarios in which we were merely observers or helpless witnesses. To the extent that our behavior in these scenarios is prescribed and predetermined, it cannot be creatively addressed in Bakhtin's sense of the term; it can only be decoded and diagnosed. Much as Dostoevsky had faulted Tolstoy (rightly or wrongly) for approaching all events, even current ones, as an "historian" rather than a novelist, so Bakhtin might be said to fault Freud for placing all the important events of the psyche in a prefigured past.

Bakhtin's response to "the self according to Freud", we might say, is the entire edifice of polyphony. For polyphony guarantees two values that Bakhtin felt were always threatened by "psychologism": the radical *singularity* of the person, and maximum, non-clinical, everyday *access* to that person's world. To the extent that Dostoevsky's heroes reflected those values, Bakhtin could celebrate them.

Notes

- 1 See Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, eds., "Introduction" to *Rethinking Bakhtin* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1989), Part Two, "The Disputed Texts", 31-49. The pioneers in this project to deconflate Bakhtin and his associates were I.R.Titunik and Nina Perlina.
- 2 "From Notes Made in 1970-71", in M.M.Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1986), 147.
- 3 Gerald Pirog, "The Bakhtin Circle's Freud: From Positivism to Hermeneutics", *Poetics Today*, vol.8, #3-4 (1987): 591-610.
- 4 This discussion of Bakhtin's difficulties with "Freudian-style" thought is adapted from Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, *Bakhtin: Creation of a Poetics* (Stanford UP, forthcoming 1990), ch.5: "Psychology: Authoring a Self".
- 5 "Avtor i geroi v esteticheskoi deiatel'nosti", M.Bakhtin, *Ėstetika slovesnogo tvorchestva* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1979), 89. In Bakhtin's view, neither could the soul be a problem of ethics; as he goes on to explain, "methodologically" the soul could only be a problem of aesthetics (an interaction between "given" and "posited" components).
- 6 "Menya zovut psikhologom: ne pravda, ya lish' realist v vysshem smysle". Cited in M.Bakhtin, *Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo* (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1979), 70-71; trans. in Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* [henceforth PDP] (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1984) 60-61.
- 7 In *Psychology and Marxism* (1925), for example, Luria stressed the compatibility of the two systems: both were monist, materialist, anti-behavioralist, hospitable to clinical experiment, and reassuringly "scientific" rather than speculative or mystical.
- 8 Bakhtin, *Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo*, 313; trans. PDP, 288.
- 9 Bakhtin, "Avtor i geroi" [fn.5], 23-25.
- 10 M.Bakhtin, "K filosofii postupka", in *Filosofia i sotsiologiya nauki i tekhniki* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 95, 121. Bakhtin most likely wrote this 80-page segment on ethical responsibility before "Avtor i geroi" (i.e. 1919-22).
- 11 Bakhtin, "Avtor i geroi" [fn.5], 22.
- 12 Sigmund Freud. "Creative Writers and Daydreaming", in Hazard Adams, ed. *Critical Theory Since Plato* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1971), 749.
- 13 See, for example, the January 1877 entry in *Diary of a Writer*, "Three Ideas".

- 14 For a short biography in English, see the entry on Ukhtomsky [1875-1942] in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, ed. Charles Gillispie (New York, Scribner's, vol. XIII, 529-30).
- 15 Simonetta Salvestroni (Universita di Cagliari) noted the Ukhtomsky connection in a paper delivered at the International Bakhtin Conference at Queen's University, Ontario, October 7-9, 1983: "Bachtin in Soviet and West European Semiotic Research" (Conference Proceedings, pp.199-201); Michael Holquist is currently at work on a study of Russian science and the creative process, where Ukhtomsky is apparently discussed in detail.
- 16 The clinical experiment that prompted Ukhtomsky to his insight (1904) involved a dog who unexpectedly failed to respond to routine electrical stimulation of the motor cortex; suddenly, just as unexpectedly, the dog defecated, after which the stimulus-response pattern was restored. Ukhtomsky pondered this lesson in "creative interruption" all his life. For one description of the experiment and its significance in his later thought, see Ukhtomsky's "Dominanta kak faktor povedeniia" (1927) in the anthology: A.A.Ukhtomskii, *Dominanta* (M-L: Nauka, 1966), esp. 75-76.
- 17 Ukhtomsky, "Dominanta kak faktor povedeniia", 80-81. Further consecutive references to this essay given in the text.
- 18 Cited in V.L.Merkulov, "O vlianii F.M.Dostoevskogo na tvorcheskie iskaniiia A.A.Ukhtomskogo" (*Voprosy filosofii* 11, 1971), 119. further references to this article included in text.
- 19 This responds in some degree to the legitimate query by James Rice, who along with many others assumed (t least in 1985) the majority conflationist position on the "disputed text" question: "What Bakhtin's admirers have yet to explain is why the esteemed critic of Dostoevsky condoned the publication of his own private papers on Freud in this shabby paste-up format..." James L.Rice, *Dostoevsky and the Healing Art* (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1985), 221-22.